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IN THE SUPRE~ffi COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADHEAD, guardian, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET 
S. CARTER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
This appeal contests the findings of the Trial Court 
that Carna Peterson understood the transaction with the 
respondents. The respondents allege in their brief that the 
Trial Court correctly decided the issue of Carna Peterson's 
competency, and further argue that the appellant lacks 
standing to bring this appeal. This brief is necessary to 
outline those additional factors which should be considered 
by this Court showing the great weight of evidence against 
the court's finding, and to answer the allegations raised by 
the respondents' attack on appellant's standing to bring 
this appeal. 
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POINT I 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY AGAINST TH E TRIA;_ 
COURT'S FINDING THAT CARNA PETERSON UNDERSTOOD THE TRANS-
ACTION WITH THE RESPONDENTS. 
The respondents argue in their brief that Carna Pete 
rso: 
coherently expressed her purpose in selling the subject 
property. They would have the Court believe that the trans-
action proceeded smoothly without incident and that Carna 
Peterson and "her" attorney, Milton Harmon consummated the 
sale. of her home over a period of two days. 
A close reading of the record on appeal, however, would 
indicate that the respondents had "their" attorney, Milton 
Harmon, present to oversee the transaction. (R. 76). The 
attorney was paid by the respondents. (R.l73). It is readi!.' 
I 
conceded by the appellants that Carna Peterson trusted the 
attorney, (R.84), but when the later actions of the only 
other independent witness Don Gowers are examined, it is 
clearly shown that something was indeed wrong with the 
transaction. 
Don Gowers testified under oath that he was induced to I 
I 
come to the rest home by the respondents to merely talk wilfil 
Hrs. Peterson about the lien. (R.l32) . He further testifi,' 
that he had no knowledge that any deed was going to be 
signed. (R.l32). Finally, due to the fact that Don Gowers I 
felt that Carna Peterson was incapable of handling her o~ 
business affairs he then left the room wanting no part of 
the transaction. (R.l32). Immediately after leaving the i 
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room, the respondent, David Carter, cornered Don Gowers and 
told him that he should not contact the family of r~s. 
Peterson about the purchase because, as Mr. Gowers put it: 
"he didn't want me to mess this purchase up like I did the 
previous one." (R.l36). If indeed the transaction were done 
in a truly arms length fashion with a competent person, 
there would have been no need for the respondent, David 
Carter, to approach Don Gowers with that type of veiled 
threat, nor would there be any need for him to leave the 
room of the transaction, wanting no further part of it. 
Respondents would further have the Court believe that 
when Milt Harmon was questioning Carna Peterson regarding 
her intent to sell the property, that the conversation 
proceeded in a smooth manner with Mrs. Peterson immediately 
responding to the questions being put to her. There is 
nothing in the evidence, however, that supports that con-
tention. (R.77-78). Further, the respondents argue that the 
day of the execution of the deed, Carna Peterson must have 
had one of her lucid intervals. The testimony of independent 
witnesses, however, is contrary to that implication. For 
example, all of the witnesess testified that there had been 
very little, if any, deterioration of her mental state from 
the time of the transaction to the time of her testimony in 
Court. (R.57, 119, 129). Mrs. Garfield testified that Carna 
Peterson could carry on a conversation during her bright 
periods but she was never really alert. (R.57). Kathleen 
Broadhead testified that she could carry on a conversation 
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at times but that if she wrote you a letter at that same 
time, it didn't make any sense. ( R. 6 6) . Juanita Crawford 
testified that on her bright days she could eat breakfast 
and could care for her personal hygiene, (R.ll8), but was 
not competent in September of 1975 to handle a real estate 
transaction. (R.ll7). Elsie Johnson further testified that 
she could carry on a conversation on her bright days, (R.l)o 
but was incapable of handling financial matters in September 
of 1975. (R.l28). These witnesses testimony have forcef~ 
impact when it is considered that Carna L. Peterson was 
declared incompetent on the 13th of November, 1975 by order 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court. That hearing, \vith 
Judge Harlin Burns sitting as Judge in Probate No. 1,896 
was a mere two months after the execution of the deed and 
the Trial Court was requested to take judicial notice of 
that finding. (R.256). 
The inconsistencies of Milt Harmon's testimony show the, 
misplaced reliance of the Court upon this witness. For 
example, Milt Harmon testified that the deed was executedo: 
I 
September 3. (R.85). The deed, however, clearly reflects, 
that it was signed on September 2, 1975 and recorded the 
next morning. (E P-3). When the witness was confronted wit' 
this inconsistency, he testified that he was hazy on the 
date because of the intervening Labor Day holiday. (R. 83). I 
on cross-examination, however, this inconsistency became 
even more obscure when he testified that, "I do recall tha:: 
-4-
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there was a day intervening and that I put a date on this 
deed that it says the 2nd, and I'm sure that it's now my 
recollection as it wasn't until the 3rd." (R.90). This was 
in response to being questioned about the fact that Labor 
Day was on Monday, September 1, and thus of necessity there 
would have to have been a three day intervening holiday if 
this testimony were to be believed. 
When asked whether he knew what the respondents were 
paying for the house, Milt Harmon categorically answered 
that-he did not know what the respondents were paying for 
the house only that $1,000.00 was going to the family and 
the balance of the money would go to the welfare department 
to satisfy their lien. (R.88-89). However, when cross-
examined about plaintiffs' Exhibit P-4, which clearly indi-
cated that he had received notice of the purchase price 
sometime shortly after August 29, 1975, the witness admitted 
that he had recalled getting the letter and discussed the 
matter with the respondents. (R.99-100. Compare R.245). 
Mr. Harmon further testified that he called Anna 
Broadhead to tell her of the transaction on September 2, 
1975. (R.79). He claims that Mrs. Broadhead called him back 
either that evening or the next morning. Linda Garfield, 
however, testified that Milt Harmon called Anna Broadhead on 
the 3rd of September and she was present when that phone 
call took place. (R.50. Compare R.l37). This is critical 
since that phone call would have been after the deed was 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
signed and recorded. 
Milt Harmon testified that LeRoy Jackson and he had a 
phone conversation demanding return of the property and he 
conveyed that message on to the respondents. (R. 91-92). 
The respondent David Carter testified, however, that he had 
never had that conversation with Mr. Harmon and was unawa~ 
of any problem until he received the demand letter from the 
plaintiff's attorney, marked as plaintiff's Exhibit 7. 
(R.l77, R.241, R.239). This testimony was further weakened 
by his admission that he felt: "That before the deed had 
been signed and the transaction completed that the family 
should be contacted." (R.90). In addition, instead of 
having Mrs. Peterson executing the affidavit of survivorship 
which became part of plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, Milt Harmon had 
the respondents execute the same. (R.252. Compare Exhibit 
P-6). 
The respondents argue that Larry Broadhead, as spokesman 
for the family, clearly authorized and gave his blessing 
to the completion of the transaction. However, Mr. Broadhea: 
clearly stated that: 
Q 
A 
And you said you had no objections, is that correc: 
I said I had no objections, that my mother was 
handling it. At this time I had no interest in it, and at 
that time I was not guardian of Carna Peterson. 
Q Yes. But at that time you didn't have any objectici 
and you told him that? 
A I told him that I had no say on the matter and 
that he would have to go through my mother. 
-6-
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Q \~ell, did you object to it at that time? 
A At that time I didn't. I didn't object to him 
talking to my mother, no. (R.l5). 
In fact, the respondents testified that Larry Broadhead was 
the only member of the family that they contacted regarding 
the property and left it up to Milt Harmon to contact Anna 
Broadhead. (R.l72). 
Respondents place a great deal of reliance upon the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Tate v. Murphy, 202 Okl. 671, 
217 P.2d. 177 (1950). Although not controlling in the State 
of Utah, that case does show the type of things that the 
Court may look at to determine capacity. In Tate, for 
example, the purported incompetent person continued to 
transact her business affairs contrary to the situation 
presently before the Court. The Court found she was competent 
because she: 
" • . paid her doctor and hospital 
bills, her grocery bills, gas bills, 
insurance premiums and taxes, all by 
check. She collected her rents and 
deposited them in the bank and placed 
over $1,000.00 on time deposit. She 
had several Wills prepared . . . " 217 
P.2d. at 181. 
This is in direct contradiction to the fact situation 
presently before the Court where the evidence clearly shows 
that this 91 year old woman could not pay her own bills 
since approximately 1970. The Court in Tate further emphasized 
that: 
"While evidence of her mental condition 
prior to and after the time she made the 
transfers releasing herself of her property, 
is import~nt and deserves careful consid-
-7-
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eration, her mental condition at or 
near the time she acted is most important 
in determining the validity or invalidity 
of her acts upon that particular date. 
It was generally admitted by witnesses 
that her mental condition varied from 
time to time, depending largely upon 
whether or not she was suffering from 
her physical afflictions, or was under 
the influence of seditives given to 
relieve her." 217 P.2d. at 182. 
This is contrary to the case presently before this 
Court. Don Gowers got up in the middle of the transaction 
and left because he did not feel that she was competent to 
execute the deed. Furthermore, independent witnesses testi-
fied that Carna Peterson was in the same approximate mental 
state of awareness and capacity at the time she was in 
Court as she was in September of 1975. Finally, in the~ 
1 
decision, there was not a single witness who saw the incom-
petent person within ten days of the tranfer which is 
contrary to the facts herein since Don Gowers, Juanita 
Crawford and Elsie Johnson and other members of the family 
saw Hrs. Peterson at or near the time of the signing of the 
deed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court 
errored in failing to find that this 91 year old woman 
living in a rest home had the necessary capacity to execute 1 
a deed and sale for her acre lot and home for $3,200.00~ 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT DOES HAVE STANDING TO BRING 'l'HIS ACTION, 
I 
AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
-8-
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The respondents argue that this suit is merely a 
vexatious claim in which the appellants will receive no 
benefit. They admit, however, that the State of Utah which 
is a party to this action, has standing and a valid interest 
in the proceedings. This Court has consistently held, 
however, that: 
"The reason the defendant has the right 
to have a cause of action prosecuted by 
the real party in interest is so that 
the judgment will preclude any action 
on the same demand by another and permit 
the defendants to assert all defenses 
or counter-claims available against the 
real owner of the cause. Shaw v. Jeppson, 
239 P.2d. 745 (1952). 
The Court does have before it, the real parties in 
interest and this claim of the respondents is without merit. 
The respondents further argue that this claim should 
not be before this Court since the consideration given for 
the property was adequate. They cite in support of this 
proposition, 23 Arn.Jur. 2d. Sec. 66 on Deeds. A complete 
reading of that Section, however, clearly shows the mis-
application of that proposition to the case at hand: 
"Any valuable consideration, even a 
nominal sum of money, is sufficient, 
as between the parties and their 
privieas, to render a deed operative 
to pass title to property. Although 
adequacy of consideration is an element 
is a case where the instrument is 
alleged to have been s~cured by fraud 
or in a suit to set aslde the transfer 
of an expectancy of to reform the dee~, 
it is immaterial where the sole questlon is 
whether a deed of bargain and sale is 
operative to pass the property." (Emphasis 
Added). 
-9-
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It is clear from a complete reading of that citation 
that the case before this Court is of a nature that the 
argument of lack of consideration is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a complete review of the record in this matter, 
the Court should reverse the Trial Judge's finding that 
Carna Peterson knew and understood the transaction she 
entered into with respondents. The great weight of the 
evidence is against any other such finding. 
1978. 
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